Litigation Supply Should Not Exceed Shareholder ADR Demand: How Proper Use of the Demand Requirement in Derivative Suits Can Decrease Corporate Litigation by Barsalona, Joseph C.
BARSALONA 3/19/2012 1:44 PM 
 
[773] 
Comment 
JOSEPH C. BARSALONA II* 
Litigation Supply Should Not Exceed 
Shareholder ADR Demand: How 
Proper Use of the Demand 
Requirement in Derivative Suits Can 
Decrease Corporate Litigation 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 774 
I.  The Demand Requirement and Its Role in the Derivative 
Suit......................................................................................... 776 
 A. Derivative Suits .............................................................. 776 
 1. General Theory and Procedure ................................. 777 
 2. Standing Requirements for Derivative Suits ............ 778 
 B. The Demand Requirement ............................................. 781 
 1. Demand Requirements for Delaware Corporations .. 781 
 2. Special Litigation Committees ................................. 784 
II.  The ADR Policies Behind Demand ....................................... 786 
 A. Theory and Purpose ........................................................ 786 
 B. Judicial and Academic Criticism of the Demand 
Requirement ................................................................... 788 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2012, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; B.A., 
Middlebury College.  Chief Managing Editor, The Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution 2011–2012.  I would like to thank my fiancée Alison Robbins for her patience, 
support, and unyielding love.  Thanks also to my beloved parents, Joe and Joanne 
Barsalona, whose passion and intellect I can only hope to one day emulate. 
BARSALONA 3/19/2012  1:44 PM 
774 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 773 
III.  Integrating the MBCA Rules Will Increase In-House 
Dispute Resolution ................................................................ 789 
 A. Reducing the Amount of Demand Futility Claims ......... 790 
 1. Making Demand Mandatory..................................... 790 
 2. The Ninety-Day Time Limit for Response Before 
Subsequent Legal Action .......................................... 792 
 B. The MBCA Method Increases Communication 
Between the Board and Shareholders ............................. 793 
 C. The MBCA Method Allows Shareholders to Bring 
Suit if All Else Fails ....................................................... 794 
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 794 
 
INTRODUCTION 
magine that you are a shareholder of a Fortune 500 company.1  One 
morning you wake up, open today’s edition of The New York 
Times, and see an article on the front page about your company.2  
You read the headline, and your jaw drops: the CEO has a five-
million-dollar salary despite the fact that he spends more time on 
vacation in Cabo, Mexico, than he does in the boardroom.  Assuming 
that you love this company and are not willing to sell your shares, 
what recourse exists?  For you, your fellow shareholders, and even 
the company itself, the answer depends on the state in which your 
company is incorporated.3 
To confront corporate misfeasance, a shareholder may bring either 
a class action lawsuit4 or a derivative lawsuit.5  In the last twenty 
 
1 To view the current list of America’s largest corporations, see Fortune 500: Our 
Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations, CNN MONEY (May 23, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/ fortune500/2011/full_list. 
2 Under the shareholder primacy principle, shareholders are the legal owners of a 
publicly held corporation while the officers and directors of the corporation are the 
shareholders’ agents.  See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535 (2006) (Shareholder primacy is “the 
view that managers’ fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth 
and preclude them from giving independent consideration to the interests of other 
constituencies.”). 
3 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991) (holding that the 
demand requirement is substantive state law and thus is controlled by the internal affairs 
doctrine).  The doctrine exists to maintain the objective of “having the rights and liabilities 
of those persons with respect to the corporation governed by a single law.”  Id. at 106 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 cmt. e (1971)). 
4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996); Marx v. 
Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996).  It must be noted that FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 was 
amended in 2007.  See infra note 29.  However, the Advisory Committee’s Note states that 
I
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years, class action litigation has increased substantially while 
derivative litigation has remained stagnant.6  The reason behind this 
trend is simple: while class action lawsuits allow parties to sue a 
corporation directly, parties filing derivative suits must go through the 
process of requesting that the company essentially sue itself by 
making demand upon the company.7  Because of this languid process, 
savvy plaintiffs’ attorneys have long evaded corporate codes by 
skipping over the demand procedure while state case law permitted 
them to do so.8  As a result, companies fight hundreds of class action 
lawsuits every year in court without ever having the opportunity to 
resolve disputes with shareholders internally.9 
There is a way to fix this problem.  It starts with states amending 
the demand requirement in their corporate codes.  If shareholders 
avoid the requirement because it consistently leaves them in the dark 
about their rights, it is the state legislature’s responsibility to modify 
state corporate codes—the codified version of each state’s demand 
requirement—by revitalizing the originally intended dispute 
resolution policies of demand.  The Model Business Corporation 
Act’s (MBCA)10 demand procedure, which eighteen states have 
adopted already,11 could provide the best statutory framework for 
 
the changes are “intended to be stylistic only.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 advisory committee’s 
note.  This analysis will focus on the language of the new rule.  However, because the 
2007 revisions were only stylistic in nature, this does not change prior analyses of the rule 
in any consequential manner. 
6 Jesse Tiko Smallwood, Nationwide, State Law Class Actions and the Beauty of 
Federalism, 53 DUKE L.J. 1137, 1152 (stating that “state court class action filings 
increased 1,315 percent” in the 1990s). 
7 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (allowing any party to sue directly), with FED. R. CIV. P. 
23.1 (“The complaint must be verified and must . . . (3) state with particularity: (A) any 
effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable 
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not 
making the effort.”). 
8 See Grimes, 673 A.2d 1207 (setting the standard for demand excusal in Delaware); 
Marx, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (qualifying the excusal standard for New York corporations).  
Demand excusal is discussed infra Part II. 
9 For a comprehensive list of current class action lawsuits, see CLASS ACTION WORLD, 
http://www.classactionworld.com (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
10 MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT (2006) [hereinafter MBCA]. 
11 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-742 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-722 
(West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.07401 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-742 
(West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-173 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-742 
(West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 753 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
450.1493a (2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-7.42 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-
1-543 (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2072 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-
A:7.42 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-42 (2011); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 21.553 
(West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-740 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1 
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derivative lawsuits.  The MBCA’s version strengthens the alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) policies behind the requirement12 and is the 
best solution for reducing the number of class actions and overall 
volume of litigation between companies and their shareholders. 
This Comment explores the contours of the demand requirement—
the forgotten ADR mechanism available to all litigating 
shareholders—and how its efficient use could be beneficial for all 
parties as well as for the greater corporate community.  Part I 
describes the derivative suit and the demand requirement generally, 
with particular attention focused on the procedures in Delaware and 
New York.  Because these two states have the highest number of 
domestic incorporations of all states,13 it is important to see how their 
processes change the landscape of the requirement. 
Part II delves more deeply into the demand requirement and begins 
to explain its ADR policies and characteristics.  Part III describes the 
MBCA model and explains why it gives the best possibility for 
improvement with corporate ADR.  Part III discusses the positive 
effects in the states that have adopted the MBCA and how the same 
changes to other corporate codes could be the best way for companies 
and shareholders to save time and money.  Finally, the Comment 
reemphasizes the importance of the demand requirement, argues why 
more states and corporations would benefit from it, and promotes the 
MBCA as an effective model for the future. 
I 
THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT AND ITS ROLE IN THE DERIVATIVE SUIT 
A.  Derivative Suits 
While class action lawsuits garner the most press,14 derivative suits 
provide a more cooperative option for shareholders to fix companies.  
Through enabling statutes in state corporate codes, derivative 
plaintiffs can assert their rights against all types of “wrongdoers,” 
including employees within the company and third parties that 
 
(West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0742 (West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-742 
(West 2011). 
12 These policies are discussed in depth infra Part III. 
13 DALE ARTHUR OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 137 (3d ed. 
2005) (stating that “[a]pproximately 60 percent of the largest industrial firms are 
incorporated in Delaware”). 
14 See CLASS ACTION WORLD, supra note 9. 
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harmed the corporate entity.15  While shareholders must overcome 
many hurdles to bring a derivative suit,16 those steps are meant to 
facilitate the parties’ collaboration to avoid court appearances.17  
Experts already note the beneficial role collaboration plays in the 
corporate landscape in creating relationships with suppliers;18 
collaboration between shareholders and boards of directors19 would 
yield similar benefits.  The derivative lawsuit is therefore a valuable 
tool that should remain the top choice for any shareholder trying to 
amend an in-house problem. 
1.  General Theory and Procedure 
Generally speaking, when a shareholder brings a derivative suit, he 
or she steps into the shoes of the corporation in order to sue a third 
party on the corporation’s behalf.20  Such suits are useful because an 
attentive shareholder may spot a problem through certain sources, 
such as newspapers,21 that the company’s agents were too 
preoccupied to notice.  Of course, the suits are usually based on 
problems caused by those agents themselves,22 and so this option 
exists for those shareholders who do not trust the officers hired to 
resolve the company’s problems from within. 
Once a shareholder steps into the shoes of the company, the party 
being sued is the group of individuals who run the company or a third 
 
15 Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative 
Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1345 (1993).  For explicit 
language about the derivative suit being within shareholders’ rights, see, for example, N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(a) (2011) (“An action may be brought in the right of a domestic or 
foreign corporation . . . by a holder of shares . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
17 See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (describing the demand 
requirement as a threshold mechanism designed to “prevent abuse and to promote 
intracorporate dispute resolution”). 
18 See generally INST. OF MGMT. & ADMIN., HOW TO DETERMINE THE SUPPLIER 
RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT MODEL (2003) (advocating the use of collaboration and 
other forms of ADR when drafting contracts with suppliers). 
19 “Board(s) of directors” is hereinafter “board(s).” 
20 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996) (“If a claim belongs to the 
corporation, it is the corporation, acting through its board . . . which must make the 
decision whether or not to assert the claim.”). 
21 See In re Cendant Corp. Derivative Action Litig., 96 F. Supp. 2d 394, 401 (D.N.J. 
2000) (plaintiffs found grounds for suit based on facts in a New York Times article). 
22 Compare Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1210 (plaintiff sued the board based on an allegedly 
wasteful employment agreement), with Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (N.Y. 
1996) (plaintiff sued board on alleged self-dealing through excessive awards). 
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party.23  Considering that the officers’ and directors’ primary function 
is to make money for the shareholders,24 the shareholder has the 
prerogative to sue those agents who breached their fiduciary duties.25  
In that sense, the derivative suit is analogous to parents punishing 
their children for shirking their chores: while the parents lose time 
and must expend effort, they do so with the hope that their 
punishment will incentivize better behavior by their children. 
2.  Standing Requirements for Derivative Suits 
Because a shareholder sues to redress an injury to the company 
rather than an injury to the shareholder itself,26 potential plaintiffs 
must satisfy a number of strict standing requirements to bring suit.27  
Each state may differ on its precise requirements.  However, the 
majority of states28 follow the standing requirements of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23.1.29  A discussion of those 
requirements follows. 
 
23 Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1210. 
24 Lee, supra note 2, at 535.  Lee defines shareholder primacy as “the view that 
managers' fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders' wealth and preclude 
them from giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies.”  Id. 
25 For a general discussion on fiduciary duty doctrine, see Paula J. Dalley, To Whom It 
May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business Associations, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515, 519–
29 (2001). 
26 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (“Devised as a suit in 
equity, the purpose of the derivative action was to place in the hands of the individual 
shareholder a means to protect the interests of the corporation . . . .”). 
27 See Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) (“[B]ecause the derivative 
action impinges on the managerial freedom of directors, the law imposes certain 
prerequisites to the exercise of this remedy.”). 
28 Most states that have not adopted the MBCA, see supra note 11, have adopted some 
form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Judith Schemel Suelzle, Note, Trust 
Beneficiary Standing in Shareholder Derivative Actions, 39 STAN. L. REV. 267, 276 
(1986). 
29 The current version of FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 reads: 
(a) Prerequisites. This rule applies when one or more shareholders or members of 
a corporation or an unincorporated association bring a derivative action to 
enforce a right that the corporation or association may properly assert but has 
failed to enforce. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that 
the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of shareholders 
or members who are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or 
association. 
(b) Pleading Requirements.  The complaint must be verified and must: (1) allege 
that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction 
complained of, or that the plaintiff's share or membership later devolved on it by 
operation of law; (2) allege that the action is not a collusive one to confer 
jurisdiction that the court would otherwise lack; and (3) state with particularity: 
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First, to bring suit under the FRCP, the plaintiff must have been a 
shareholder at the time of the wrong, or “the plaintiff’s share or 
membership [in the corporation] later devolved on it by operation of 
law.”30  If an individual learns of the problem, buys shares of the 
corporation, and then attempts to sue on behalf of the corporation, 
standing would prevent that individual from proceeding with the 
suit.31  Second, the law requires that the shareholder have a stake in 
the company so that as long as the suit continues, the plaintiff will 
share in the stock’s financial gains or losses during the litigation.32  
This requirement deters plaintiffs who would prefer a high stock price 
 
(A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the directors or 
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members; and 
(B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the effort. 
(c) Settlement, Dismissal, and Compromise.  A derivative action may be settled, 
voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval.  Notice of 
a proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise must be given to 
shareholders or members in the manner that the court orders. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 was revised in 2007, but the changes were stylistic only.  See supra 
note 5.  As such, pre-2007 case law interpreting Rule 23.1 remains applicable and useful. 
 In an attempt to clarify the language of the original version of Rule 23.1, as well as the 
state codifications of the rule, courts have given varying interpretations of specific 
provisions over the years.  See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996).  It 
remains to be seen whether newer suits will challenge the common-law doctrine that is 
based on the old language to align with the revision or whether the states will amend their 
codes altogether. 
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(1). 
31 This problem has shown itself more in Japanese derivative suits where instead of 
having a “contemporaneous ownership requirement,” Japanese shareholders need only 
have owned shares for six months to be eligible to bring suit.  See Mark D. West, The 
Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1436, 1448 (1994).  In contrast to the Japanese system, because the majority of 
damages from American derivative suits go back into the company itself, this category of 
suits has never been a “get-rich-quick” option for American shareholder plaintiffs; in fact, 
they are often more expensive than a shareholder feels is necessary.  See id. at 1472–73 
(describing the various ways in which a derivative suit proves costly to plaintiffs around 
the world); see also Morgan N. Neuwirth, Comment, Shareholder Franchise–No 
Compromise: Why the Delaware Courts Must Proscribe All Managerial Interference with 
Corporate Voting, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 423, 476 (1996) (“The shareholder derivative suit 
is an expensive, post hoc tool, designed ‘only for remedying violations of legal norms, not 
for policing underperformance, slack, or incompetence.’” (quoting ROBERT CHARLES 
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 9.5, at 397 (1986))). 
32 See Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation: The Delaware Courts’ Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 589, 627 (2008) (describing how “[i]ncreased shareholder derivative suits could 
cause investors to lose confidence in director-managed corporations” thereby hurting the 
price of the stock in the market). 
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to litigation that might risk depreciating the stock’s value.33  Third, 
the plaintiff must “fairly and adequately” represent the other 
shareholders.34  In other words, the hardship that the plaintiff-
shareholder experienced must not be one that only he or she 
experienced personally but rather one that all shareholders suffered 
collectively; plaintiffs who have a significant number of shares of a 
particular corporation will often be able to meet this requirement.35 
Additionally, because derivative suits are state substantive law,36 
many states have their own financial standing requirements that 
accompany the legal standing requirements.37  For example, some 
states require a plaintiff to pay a bond to the corporation in order to 
bring suit,38 while others require only specific parties to be paid upon 
the completion of the suit.39  These additional requirements not only 
make derivative suits expensive, but they motivate shareholders to 
pursue a different legal route altogether, hence the growing popularity 
of class action lawsuits.40 
 
33 See Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 
82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1743 (1994) (explaining that derivative suits are rare when they will 
result in decreased corporate value). 
34 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949) (noting that 
whichever shareholder is brave enough to bring a derivative suit becomes a “volunteer 
champion” who is acting as a “representative of a class comprising all who are similarly 
situated”); HER, Inc. v. Parenteau, 770 N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (providing a 
comprehensive list of elements used to determine whether a shareholder fairly and 
adequately represents similarly situated shareholders). 
35 See Estate of Soler v. Rodríguez, 63 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1995) (plaintiff’s ownership 
of 50.43% of all outstanding voting stock was sufficient for standing in a derivative suit); 
Albers v. Edelson Tech. Partners L.P., 31 P.3d 821, 827 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) 
(questioning whether holders of convertible securities and other low-percentage 
shareholders have standing to bring derivative suits). 
36 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108–09 (1991) (holding that the 
demand requirement is substantive state law). 
37 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6(3) (West 2011) (requiring a shareholder-
plaintiff holding less than five percent of the outstanding stock of the corporation “to give 
security for reasonable expenses”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 2012) 
(allowing the defendant corporation to request a bond from the plaintiff shareholder before 
commencement of the suit); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.07.400(4) (West 2011) 
(shifting expenses onto plaintiff if the court finds the suit was filed “without reasonable 
cause”).  All of these requirements add to the costs of filing a derivative suit; those costs 
do not exist in class action filings.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (excluding any type of 
provision related to the expenses involved in filing a class action). 
38 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6(3); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627. 
39 See MBCA § 7.46(2) (requiring the plaintiff to pay all expenses where the court finds 
that there was no “reasonable cause” for the claim); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.                     
§ 23B.07.400. 
40 Websites such as CLASS ACTION WORLD, supra note 9, provide a quick and efficient 
tool for begrudged shareholders. 
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B.  The Demand Requirement 
Once a shareholder satisfies the state’s requisite standing 
requirements, it must next make a demand before being able to bring 
a derivative suit.41  In broad terms, a demand is an official request by 
a shareholder to a board to remedy a problem with the company.  
Theoretically, if the shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation, it 
follows that the plaintiff must request permission from the board to 
bring suit.42  Therefore, the plaintiff “demands” the board to either fix 
the current deficiency or to allow the shareholder to take legal action.  
The requirement is thus designed to promote intracorporate dispute 
resolution and to fix the corporation as a whole.43 
The codification of the demand requirement differs by state.  
However, because the majority of public companies are incorporated 
in Delaware,44 this Comment will examine Delaware case law 
pertaining to the demand requirement of derivative suits. 
1.  Demand Requirements for Delaware Corporations 
A demand in Delaware consists of a shareholder contacting the 
company’s board of directors and explaining the perceived problem.45  
One common problem, for instance, which has been the subject of 
much litigation, is that executives receive “excessive 
compensation.”46  The communication between the shareholder and 
the board that comprises the demand could be as simple as a letter,47 
and it must state the issue the shareholder wishes to remedy.48  Once 
the demand is made, the board may choose either to address the 
 
41 See Scrushy v. Tucker, 70 So. 3d 289, 300 (Ala. 2011) (showing that plaintiffs need 
both satisfaction of standing requirements and pre-suit demand for the court to have 
subject-matter jurisdiction). 
42 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1215 (Del. 1996) (stating that the decision to 
assert the claim must ultimately come from the corporation itself). 
43 See id. at 1216 (“[T]he demand requirement invokes a species of alternative dispute 
resolution procedure which might avoid litigation altogether.”); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 
619, 624 (Del. 1984) (“[T]he [demand] requirement . . . exists at the threshold . . . to 
promote intracorporate dispute resolution.”). 
44 See OESTERLE, supra note 13. 
45 See DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (1966) (providing the text 
upon which the Delaware statute is based). 
46 See, e.g., Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1207; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
47 See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1211 (plaintiff’s demand letter was sufficient under the 
corporate code). 
48 See, e.g., id. at 1211–12 (plaintiff’s letter to the board stated explicitly, “I hereby 
demand that the Board . . . take immediate steps to abrogate . . . the Employment 
Agreement” of the defendant.). 
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problem or do nothing.49  Usually, if the board chooses to address the 
problem, it will assemble a special litigation committee.50 
Most plaintiffs, however, do not trust the board to remedy their 
demands.51  As a result, they attempt to bypass the requirement by 
asking a court to “excuse” demand because it would be futile.52  To 
do so, plaintiffs’ attorneys plead in their pretrial motions why there is 
reasonable doubt that the board will diligently handle shareholders’ 
complaints because the board members are conflicted.53  If the judge 
is convinced, the court excuses the demand requirement and allows 
the suit to proceed to trial.54  Suits in which the demand requirement 
is excused usually settle for millions of dollars, with the majority 
going to the plaintiff’s attorney.55  At the same time, the shareholder 
 
49 In Delaware, the choice to seek or terminate litigation is governed by the “business 
judgment rule,” an almost impenetrable barrier for shareholders.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., 
New Myths and Old Realities: The American Law Institute Faces the Derivative Action, 48 
BUS. LAW. 1407, 1412 (1993); Andrew C.W. Lund, Rethinking Aronson: Board Authority 
and Overdelegation, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 703, 704 (2009) (“[After demand is made, 
b]oards are then free, within the boundaries of their fiduciary duties, to determine whether 
to accept or refuse the demand.”).  The business judgment rule is a presumption that 
directors make corporate decisions with the best interests of the company in mind.  See, 
e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52–53 (Del. 2006) (requiring a 
showing that the defendant directors acted grossly negligent in order to defeat the 
“business judgment rule presumptions”).  Only a showing of gross negligence on the part 
of directors can rebut the presumption for duty-of-care purposes.  See id. at 52. 
50 Special litigation committees are discussed infra Part II.2. 
51 See Kurt A. Goehre, Is the Demand Requirement Obsolete? How the United Kingdom 
Modernized Its Shareholder Derivative Procedure and What the United States Can Learn 
from It, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 140, 146 (2010) (“Many shareholders opt not to make a 
demand on the board of directors because the board often decides that the litigation is not 
in the best interests of the corporation and, thus, a court is unlikely to alter the board's 
decision and disturb its business judgment.”). 
52 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).  The original futility test was a 
two-prong, alternative inquiry that could easily be defeated by a diligent shareholder: 
“[U]nder the particularized facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the 
directors are disinterested and independent and (2) the challenged transaction was 
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”  Id. 
53 See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1216 (stating that there must be a “‘reasonable doubt’ . . . 
that the board is capable of making an independent decision to assert the claim if demand 
were made”). 
54 The Delaware Supreme Court stated, 
The basis for claiming excusal would normally be that: (1) a majority of the 
board has a material financial or familial interest; (2) a majority of the board is 
incapable of acting independently for some other reason such as domination or 
control; or (3) the underlying transaction is not the product of a valid exercise of 
business judgment . . . . 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
55 This is true because all damages received by plaintiffs revert back into the 
corporation while the main profits come from the attorneys’ fees.  See DEL. CH. CT. R. 
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and the company both come out as losers: the shareholder obtains 
only a moral victory over his or her company, and the company 
suffers a financial and reputational blow.  Therefore, excusal of the 
demand requirement based on futility both eliminates ADR between 
the parties and leads to outcomes that benefit neither the shareholder 
nor the company significantly.56 
If the power to excuse demand mortally wounds the procedure, the 
effect of making demand, and the board refusing it, ultimately kills 
it.57  In Delaware, once a shareholder makes actual demand upon a 
corporation, he or she waives a claim of excusal.58  Therefore, 
considering the difficulty in pleading “wrongful refusal”59 with 
particularity,60 the shareholder may have already lost his or her case 
 
23.1(b)(i)–(ii) (entitling the winning party to “fees, costs or other payments as the Court 
expressly approves”); see also N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(e) (McKinney 2011) (stating 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys may receive “reasonable attorneys’ fees” for either a judgment or 
settlement while the plaintiff is “limited to a recovery of the loss or damage sustained by 
them”). 
 Another burdensome addition to the cost of derivative litigation is requesting the 
company’s books and records.  Normally, before a plaintiff files a derivative claim, he or 
she will request the company’s books and records in order to find data that can bolster the 
complaint.  Even before the derivative suit filing, attorneys’ fees range from $10,000 to 
$25,000 for “simple stocklist cases” and from $20,000 to $50,000 for “straightforward 
books and records cases.”  Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of 
Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
331, 357–58 (1996).  Professor Thomas discusses how a books-and-records request works 
well as a precursor to a demand futility claim notwithstanding its cost.  Id. at 358. 
56 See Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123, 144 (Md. 2001) (“The futility exception 
essentially eliminates any chance at meaningful pre-litigation alternative dispute 
resolution.  It also virtually assures extensive and expensive judicial wrangling over a 
peripheral issue that may result in preliminary determinations regarding director 
culpability that, after trial on the merits, turn out to be unsupportable.”). 
57 See Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1219 (creating a stronger standard to prove wrongful refusal 
of demand if a corporation chooses to set aside the complaint). 
58 See Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774–75 (Del. 1990) (actual demand waived 
the right of excusal even if the suit was filed prior to formal demand). 
59 The Grimes court described “wrongful refusal” and where it fits into the derivative 
suit analysis as follows: 
If a demand is made and rejected, the board rejecting the demand is entitled to 
the presumption of the business judgment rule unless the stockholder can allege 
facts with particularity creating a reasonable doubt that the board is entitled to the 
benefit of the presumption.  If there is reason to doubt that the board acted 
independently or with due care in responding to the demand, the stockholder may 
have the basis ex post to claim wrongful refusal. 
673 A.2d at 1219 (emphasis added) (internal footnotes omitted). 
60 See Note, Discovery in Federal Demand-Refused Derivative Litigation, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1025, 1028–29 (1992) (stating that most jurisdictions, including Delaware, 
prohibit shareholder plaintiffs from having the benefit of discovery before filing suit and, 
as a result, “[s]uch decisions create a virtually insurmountable obstacle for shareholders 
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merely by asking permission from the board.61  As a result, many 
potentially substantive suits will be lost in the process as the 
shareholder is caught in an inevitable “Catch-22”: the shareholder 
must either plead reasonable doubt or concede that the board was 
disinterested.62  Thus, shareholders looking for help from Delaware 
courts for claims based on breach of fiduciary duty may be much 
more likely to turn to class action lawsuits than travel the labyrinthine 
paths of derivative suits. 
Clearly, Delaware has all but eliminated the derivative suit by 
making demand as unattractive as possible.  As the state with the 
most incorporations in the nation,63 Delaware must lead the way for 
other states toward demand requirement reform. 
2.  Special Litigation Committees 
Once a shareholder makes a demand, the corporation has the power 
to organize a special litigation committee.64  This committee is 
composed of independent directors65 and is specifically authorized by 
statute in some state corporate codes.66  While special litigation 
committees may be formed to terminate all types of litigation against 
the company,67 the committee’s duties in derivative suits are twofold: 
 
who have no knowledge of the internal corporate decisionmaking process and will 
effectively bar many derivative suits regardless of their merit” (internal footnotes 
omitted)). 
61 Applying the “reasonable doubt” standard to claims of wrongful refusal of demand is 
a much steeper burden on the shareholder than if he pleaded futility ex ante.  See Grimes, 
673 A.2d at 1219 (business judgment rule applies when reviewing ex post). 
62 See Coffee, supra note 49, at 1413 (requiring the shareholder to plead reasonable 
doubt under the Aronson standard or concede that the board was disinterested). 
63 For a discussion on Delaware’s stranglehold on public company incorporations and 
the state’s influence on corporate law doctrine across the country, see Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
1749 (2006). 
64 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 6019.50 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2011). 
65 Id.  To be considered an independent director, the individual must not have any 
conflict of interest—that is, he or she must be disinterested in the current litigation.  See 
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981) (holding that an inquiry into 
whether the committee is independent is a prerequisite to judging the decisions made by 
special ligation committees); Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 91 (Wis. 2000) (adopting 
the Delaware standard of review for special litigation committees). 
66 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-744(b) (West 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-32-4 
(West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:7.44(b) (2011); WIS. STAT. §180.0744(2) 
(2011).  This standard has also been read into such statutes as DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
141 (2011).  See Zapata, 430 A.2d at 782. 
67 See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 64. 
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(1) to investigate the allegations made by the shareholder68 and (2) to 
decide whether litigation is necessary or dismissible.69  While such 
committees serve the valuable purpose of dismissing meritless and 
otherwise frivolous strike suits,70 they also have the effect of 
dismissing legitimate derivative lawsuits as well.71 
For corporations, obvious drawbacks exist to creating and paying 
for a committee dedicated solely to terminating litigation by its own 
shareholders.72  However, these committees have survived scrutiny 
from courts and even constitutional attacks.73  As long as they exist, 
though, shareholders will continually face a roadblock to their claims, 
and grievances will continue without redress.  The use of special 
litigation committees epitomizes the current sad state of derivative 
suit litigation.  When examining the policies behind the rule, one can 
question whether the statutory framers ever foresaw such a result. 
 
68 See Kesling v. Kesling, 546 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (“The board may  
. . . establish a committee to investigate the allegations and determine whether the 
corporation should pursue litigation.”); Bender v. Schwartz, 917 A.2d 142, 152 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2007) (“Once a demand is made, the corporation's board . . . must conduct an 
investigation into the allegations in the demand and determine whether pursuing the 
demanded litigation is in the best interests of the corporation. . . . The board may appoint a 
committee of disinterested directors to conduct this investigation.” (citation omitted)). 
69 See Kesling, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 634–35 (“If the committee determines that pursuing a 
derivative action is not in the corporation's best interests, that determination is presumed to 
be conclusive.”). 
70 See Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“The 
purpose of [the special litigation committee enabling statute] is to grant corporations the 
ability to respond effectively to the potential abuses of strike suits, in which a single 
dissenting shareholder, owning only one share of stock, may file a derivative suit for its 
nuisance value alone.”); see also FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 64. 
71 For a discussion on the many ways meritorious claims fall on deaf ears, one of which 
is the demand procedure of derivative suits, see Douglas C. Buffone, Note, Predatory 
Attorneys and Professional Plaintiffs: Reforms Are Needed to Limit Vexatious Securities 
Litigation, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1995). 
72 Some intuitive problems include: the waste of corporate assets to gather and pay 
independent individuals to terminate litigation instead of working with the shareholders 
directly; the board handing off suits against its company instead of personally looking into 
the matter; and assigning an independent group, with possibly no ties to the company, to 
handle in-house complaints.  See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 64. 
73 See Starrels v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(opining that despite the alternative dispute resolution justification for the demand 
requirement, the requirement leads to more litigation in the aggregate); FLETCHER ET AL., 
supra note 64 (citing Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)). 
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II 
THE ADR POLICIES BEHIND DEMAND 
A.  Theory and Purpose 
Initially, the demand requirement looks like a mechanism of 
litigation procedure.  However, when analyzing the requirement’s 
intent, one sees that it creates a form of alternative dispute resolution 
within the company that effectively averts litigation.  Three 
observations support this proposition. 
First, in its simplest form, the demand requirement is a way to put a 
board on notice of both the problems it may overlook and shareholder 
disapproval of those problems.74  If used properly, the demand 
requirement could be an effective mechanism for facilitating 
improvement of the day-to-day operations of a public company.75  It 
is virtually impossible for boards of large companies to be aware of 
every single problem,76 so when the demand requirement is utilized 
properly, shareholders may have the opportunity to increase internal 
awareness and ultimately raise profits for all.  Second, as federal and 
state courts assert, the demand requirement purports to “exhaust 
intracorporate remedies” so that all damaging issues remain in-
house.77  Every company handles problems differently, but boards are 
often best equipped to fashion solutions themselves without legal 
interference.78  If demand becomes the primary means of cooperation 
between stockholders and officers, there needs to be a mechanism that 
facilitates communication between all parties during the course of the 
 
74 Indeed, actual notice is particularly important when attempting to avoid timely suits.  
A private entity would be wise to enable an official ombuds to be in charge of complaints 
and to have the power to mediate disputes between the complainant shareholders and the 
board.  See Special Feature, Ombuds Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 535 (2002) 
(describing the role that ombuds play in workplace disputes and the fact that the board 
needs to give the “ombuds” title to an individual before any communication to that 
individual is deemed actual notice). 
75 For a discussion about the positive effects of an active shareholder–board relationship 
that creates a “mediating hierarchy,” see Lee, supra note 2, at 439–41. 
76 But see Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 
2006) (holding that companies may face liability for failing to monitor their everyday 
operations). 
77 Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 811–12 (Del. 1984); see also Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 
(3d Cir. 1978). 
78 See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 781, 783–84 (2003) (opining that both insider-dominated and 
outsider-dominated boards are equated to more successful corporations in terms of return 
on assets). 
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procedure—for example, a special demand “inbox” for corporate 
counsel.79  While the “excusal” doctrine hampers the method of 
communication created by demand, a reinforcement of demand’s 
(intended) principle of intracorporate communication could positively 
reset the system. 
Finally, demand keeps shareholders and boards out of the 
courtroom, saving litigation costs for both the individual shareholder 
and the company itself.80  By contrast, plaintiffs who avoid the 
demand requirement and sue corporations directly through class 
actions force both parties to spend unnecessary time and money to 
resolve the issue.81  Considering how little plaintiffs often ultimately 
recover, it would not be surprising if many were content with an ADR 
procedure that could both save money and fix the underlying 
problems.82 
Though it is a method of civil procedure, the demand requirement 
is unquestionably an ADR mechanism that can bring shareholders and 
companies together to alleviate divisive problems within corporations.  
With this knowledge, state legislatures should amend their corporate 
codes to make the demand requirement a more accessible option. 
 
79 See Elisa Westfield, Note, Resolving Conflict in the 21st Century Global Workplace: 
The Role for Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1221, 1225–28 (2002) 
(illustrating how ADR procedures increase communication and collaboration between 
directors and shareholders). 
80 Large corporations are now seeking the services of outside organizations as a means 
to increase the use of ADR between boards and shareholders in order to decrease litigation 
costs and effectively solve the problems of those aggrieved by the status quo.  See CPR 
and GE: Working Together to Grow ADR, METRO. CORP. COUNS., July 2008, at 22. 
81 According to statistics provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the 
number of filed cases pertaining to “securities, commodities and exchanges” has risen by 
an average of 140 filings per year since the beginning of the recession in early 2008.  U.S. 
Courts, Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit, 2005 Through 2009, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2009, at 146, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/Judicial 
Business.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices/C02ASep09 
.pdf. 
82 For years, legal scholars have advocated, to no avail, the use of mediation at the early 
stages in corporate disputes.  See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the 
Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 839–47 (1998).  More support from a seemingly 
litigious procedure such as demand could be a worthwhile adjustment that could lead to 
this positive change in corporate decision making. 
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B.  Judicial and Academic Criticism of the Demand Requirement 
While some courts acknowledge demand’s positive 
characteristics,83 others question whether the requirement’s good 
intentions lead to actual change.84  Indeed, some courts come close to 
mocking demand’s dispute resolution policies.85  Is this because 
courts are cynical about demand’s effectiveness in the corporate 
setting, where share price and profits are the most important goal?86  
Or do the critics generally distrust boards to follow ADR processes 
properly?  The answer is likely a combination of both; the way in 
which corporations and “dispute resolution” clash in the scholarship 
may explain why. 
In a scathing critique of director indemnification,87 Mae 
Kuykendall, a professor at Michigan State University School of Law, 
argues that the root of the problem lies in the presumed corporate 
landscape of “self-protecting boards, greedy lawyers, [and] passive 
 
83 See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (noting how “[t]he demand 
requirement serves a salutary purpose”); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) 
(“[B]y promoting . . . alternative dispute resolution, rather than immediate recourse to 
litigation, the demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that 
directors manage the business and affairs of corporations.”). 
84 For example, Judge Easterbrook, in Starrels v. First National Bank of Chicago, was 
quite explicit in his skepticism over demand’s ADR policies: 
 Why must shareholders demand that corporations act before filing suit?  The 
rule could reflect a hope that the dispute will go away without litigation, that the 
board . . . will “do something” (or persuade the putative plaintiff that suit is 
pointless).  Demand then initiates a form of [ADR], much like mediation.  Steps 
to control the volume of litigation are welcome, and courts give this as a 
justification for the demand rule.  It is not, however, a powerful one, because on 
balance the rule creates more litigation than it prevents. 
870 F.2d 1168, 1173 (7th Cir. 1989). 
85 Note Vice Chancellor Steele’s sarcastic tone as he describes the demand requirement 
and why it does not function well in the current suit: 
In the corporate context, the demand rule is intended to act as a gatekeeper to 
both encourage extra judicial intra-corporate solutions to internal problems and 
to bar meritless claims of self-interested decision making.  How well this rule 
functions to encourage resort to the board is a question beyond our responsibility 
to answer.  In all events in the limited partnership context, the doctrine fails to 
promote judicial efficiency at least when there is a single general partner. 
Seaford Funding Ltd. P’ship v. M & M Assocs. II, 672 A.2d 66, 71 (Del. Ch. 1995). 
86 For a discussion on the shareholder primacy principle—the theory that a 
corporation’s priority should be focused on shareholders’ wealth—see generally Lee, 
supra note 2. 
87 “Director indemnification” refers to the practice of corporations paying the bill for all 
judgments against their own directors.  See Mae Kuykendall, A Neglected Policy Option: 
Indemnification of Directors for Amounts Paid to Settle Derivative Suits–Looking Past 
“Circularity” to Context and Reform, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1995). 
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shareholders.”88  In essence, parties for whom profits are the biggest 
priority are adverse to compromise; therefore, the judicial process is 
the only viable solution.89 
The problem with this corporate profile, however, is that it chills 
positive avenues of reform.  The consistent mistrust of the dispute-
resolving abilities of boards and shareholders will always bring the 
parties back into the courtroom, costing both sides money that they 
would be better off spending improving the company as a whole.90  
As a response, Ms. Kuykendall advocates “fine-tuning the mechanism 
of derivative litigation rather than making wholesale decisions about 
its vitality.”91 
If derivative suits that proceed to court are the problem, and mere 
“fine-tuning” of the procedure is all that is needed to alleviate it,92 
then the solution lies in the procedure that is most ripe and ready for 
adjustment: the demand requirement.  Jurisdictions such as Delaware 
and New York consistently allow demand to be avoided through 
futility and excusal case law.  Therefore, state legislatures in those 
jurisdictions should amend their corporate codes and court rules so 
that demand becomes a mandatory procedure obligating the parties to 
work through their disputes before courts become involved.  The 
MBCA provides a favorable model for state legislatures as to how to 
accomplish this feat. 
III 
INTEGRATING THE MBCA RULES WILL INCREASE IN-HOUSE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
A possible method to fix the current inadequacies of derivative 
suits in state corporate codes is for states to adopt the procedure set 
out in the Model Business Corporation Act.93  At least eighteen states 
have adopted the MBCA method in full;94 this number accounts for 
an increase of five states since Marx v. Akers,95 and fourteen states 
since the Supreme Court held that demand was a matter of substantive 
 
88 See id. at 1065 (footnote omitted). 
89 See id. at 1083–87. 
90 See id. at 1072–75. 
91 Id. at 1087. 
92 See id. 
93 MBCA § 7.42. 
94 See Werbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123, 141–42 (Md. 2001). 
95 See id.; Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y. 1996).  The Marx court set the 
precedent for how to decide futility for New York corporations. 
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state law in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.96  With more 
support from the ADR community, that number can continue to grow 
nationally.  The MBCA utilizes the dispute resolution mechanisms of 
a corporation by (1) reducing the number of futility claims, (2) 
increasing the amount of communication between shareholders and 
their agents, and (3) giving shareholders the right to bring suit if all 
else fails. 
A.  Reducing the Amount of Demand Futility Claims 
As mentioned, a shareholder’s pleading that demand is futile 
essentially removes the possibility that the shareholder and the 
corporation will resolve the dispute outside of the courtroom.97  The 
MBCA procedure prevents that outcome by making demand 
mandatory for all shareholders and putting a time limit on how long a 
board has to decide how to respond.98  Other courts have mentioned 
the positive potential of mandatory demand,99 and hopefully the 
future results in those states that have adopted it will prove its 
efficacy. 
1.  Making Demand Mandatory 
While Delaware and New York case law allows shareholders to 
avoid demand altogether through excusal claims, the MBCA has a 
universal demand requirement.100  This means that demand must be 
made in every case with no special exceptions.101  Under the MBCA, 
by making demand mandatory, shareholders’ attorneys are forced to 
contact the board rather than run to court with pleadings of futility 
 
96 See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 103 (1991); Werbowsky, 766 
A.2d at 141–42.  One can assume that as soon as this opinion came down, states were 
quick to amend their corporate codes in a way that was attractive to both corporations and 
shareholders alike. 
97 See supra note 59.  Because of difficulty in proving futility, a plaintiff who embarks 
on this path will have spent far too many resources and will therefore be less willing to 
negotiate with a company.  See generally Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative 
Suit, 61 VAND. L. REV. 387 (2008) (describing the requirements for excusing demand as 
futile as the most rigorous). 
98 See MBCA § 7.42. 
99 See Werbowsky, 766 A.2d at 144; Marx, 666 N.E.2d at 1038. 
100 See MBCA § 7.42. 
101 Id.  The statute’s text dictates that demand is needed before “any” derivative suit is 
commenced; there are no exceptions.  Id. 
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and excusal,102 and their clients benefit as a result.103  Moreover, 
because of the low costs associated with demand,104 the requirement 
makes dispute resolution less expensive.105 
An additional benefit of mandatory demand is that it removes the 
collective action problem that exists with most potential suits.106  
Often, because lawsuits are very expensive and time-consuming, even 
those shareholders aware of the problem are hesitant to bring suit 
themselves and would rather wait for a representative to take the 
reins.107  However, a universal demand requirement puts everyone on 
equal footing: demand must always be the first step, and those who 
bring claims of excusal do not have the first shot at monopolizing the 
company’s attention.108  The demand requirement thus removes 
greedy, individual incentives for suing a corporation, allowing 
shareholders to work with boards to fix problems through a 
collaborative method rather than the adversarial method that 
dominates the American legal psyche.109 
 
102 As is the general problem that now exists in federal courts, Delaware, and New 
York.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626 
(McKinney 2011). 
103 Mandatory rules have been advocated in directing the professional conduct of 
corporate attorneys in takeovers and might have the same positive effect on evolving 
methods of corporate governance.  See Miriam P. Hechler, The Role of the Corporate 
Attorney Within the Takeover Context: Loyalties to Whom?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 943, 980 
(1996) (“The mandatory rule enforces both the attorney’s and the board’s monitoring 
function and simultaneously protects shareholders.”). 
104 An e-mail, letter, or even a phone call to make demand does not cost nearly as much 
as making a formal demand for the shareholder books and records of a corporation.  See 
Thomas, supra note 55, at 357–58. 
105 For a discussion on universal demand, see Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation in Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested Reforms, 33 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 9, 46–47 (1997). 
106 See Seung Wha Chang, The Role of Law in Economic Development and Adjustment 
Process: The Case of Korea, 34 INT’L LAW. 267, 282 (2000) (“To solve a collective action 
problem . . . it is often necessary for lawyers to take an initiative in bringing a derivative 
suit.”). 
107 See, e.g., J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund 
Regulation, Part II, a Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 834 (2007) 
(“[M]any firms face a collective action problem. The profits from acting are exceeded by 
the individual cost of activism.”); see also Davis, supra note 97, at 433 (For many 
derivative suits, “the prospect for meaningful monetary recovery is remote and, even when 
obtained, almost always will be covered by indemnification or insurance paid for by the 
corporation.”). 
108 See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 64 (describing how a special litigation committee 
is assembled for every lawsuit that is brought against the company whether demand was 
issued or not). 
109 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of 
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983).  The author 
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2.  The Ninety-Day Time Limit for Response Before Subsequent Legal 
Action 
Under Delaware and New York law, a shareholder is generally 
unaware of when the board will respond to his or her demand.110  By 
contrast, the MBCA model imposes a ninety-day time limit for the 
company to respond.111  The ninety-day time limit is actually 
generous to corporations because it allows a relatively extensive 
amount of time to plan the next step; the Japanese derivative suit, by 
contrast, allows only thirty days for the company to respond to the 
demand.112  The intent of the time limit is that after a company 
receives notice of a pending suit,113 it will do all that it can to work 
with the shareholders to alleviate the problem rather than contact the 
company’s legal team. 
The MBCA’s time limit provides the board discretion only to 
resolve the dispute by answering the demand or to inform the plaintiff 
that the company feels it unnecessary to proceed with litigation.  By 
removing a company’s unlimited discretion on when to respond to a 
demand, the time limit forces the parties to collaborate promptly.114  
It is within the ninety-day time period that the parties can negotiate or 
mediate the problem so that a lawsuit never comes to pass.115  The 
time limit thus confers three benefits: (1) it guarantees a response for 
the shareholder within a reasonable amount of time, (2) it gives an 
appropriate window for the company to make a decision to handle the 
 
depicts the American civil suit landscape as a hunting ground for opportunistic and 
aggressive plaintiff’s lawyers.  Id. at 276.  Despite the article being a quarter century old, 
the general theme and message remain pertinent. 
110 See Thomas, supra note 55, at 354–55.  In his study, Professor Thomas finds that 
prior to filing a derivative claim, the amount of time the corporation takes to answer a 
books-and-records demand that helps the plaintiff write the complaint is as follows: “The 
median (mean) delay for shareholders obtaining the stocklist is forty-three days (112 
days), while the median (mean) delay for shareholders not obtaining the stocklist is 
seventy days (187 days).”  Id. at 355. 
111 MBCA § 7.42. 
112 See Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 105, at 48. 
113 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 
1012 (2009) (“As a practical matter, the board should view this demand as a warning; 
shareholders are seeking an explanation of the rationale behind a particular corporate 
decision or omission which is alleged to have harmed the corporation.”). 
114 Contacting the aggrieved shareholder and discussing the problem would be much 
more cost effective than assembling a special litigation committee and preparing for a 
lawsuit. 
115 It is at this point in the process where an ombuds or other forms of corporate 
mediation would certainly make a positive financial difference.  See, e.g., Ombuds 
Standards, supra note 74; Rogers & McEwen, supra note 82. 
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problem or to deny suit, and (3) it gives a fair amount of time for the 
company to prepare a defense if the suit goes forward.116 
B.  The MBCA Method Increases Communication Between the Board 
and Shareholders 
A single demand letter from a shareholder is easy to forget, but 
hundreds of such letters will compel a board to have a healthy and 
much-needed conversation with its principals.  A universal demand 
requirement provides the same incentive: it encourages open 
communication between shareholders and the board that puts the 
latter on notice of particular deficiencies.117 
A shareholder meeting is one of the few opportunities where the 
board can interact with its shareholders, but these events suffer from 
lack of attendance.118  One way to mitigate the effect of this problem 
is to promote the demand requirement as a communication tool rather 
than just a preamble to a lawsuit.119  This way, every demand letter 
could be analogous to a question at a board meeting and yet get more 
attention than it normally would in the group setting.  Demand 
pinpoints the problem and gives the parties the opportunity to 
collectively amend it.  Like any negotiation tool, the demand 
requirement obligates both sides to replace their independent goals 
with the company’s overall interests.120  The demand requirement can 
even go so far as to improve personal relationships between the board 
and shareholders.  It provides an opportunity for the board to respond 
to demand thoughtfully, which “demonstrates care in management 
 
116 As countries around the world continue to adopt the derivative suit and its 
prerequisites, scholars have advocated that the universal demand requirement would serve 
shareholders better if only because of the amount of time it saves all of the parties 
involved.  See Jiong Deng, Note, Building an Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative 
Lawsuit System in China, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 347, 379 (2005) (“[D]emand is futile when 
the alleged offenders control the management of the corporation.  In order to avoid 
wasting two months and to provide a timely remedy for shareholders, the SPC may wish to 
follow this approach and exempt futile demands.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
117 See Matwyshyn, supra note 113, at 1012. 
118 See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY 
L.J. 869, 870–71 (2010) (stating the general opinion that shareholder meetings suffer from 
poor attendance by those who are critical to the vote). 
119 Of course, the present wording of the rule in the MBCA must be amended for such a 
progressive idea to take shape. 
120 For a discussion on how all successful negotiators should focus on replacing the 
goals of the parties involved with interests, see Jill Schachner Chanen, Collaborative 
Counselors: Newest ADR Option Wins Converts, While Suffering Some Growing Pains, 92 
A.B.A. J. 52 (2006). 
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and can, perhaps, prevent shareholders from selling shares out of 
anger.” 121 
C.  The MBCA Method Allows Shareholders to Bring Suit if All Else 
Fails 
In any negotiation or mediation, talks sometimes break down, and 
litigation follows.  While lawsuits should be avoided where possible, 
the MBCA model allows aggrieved shareholders the opportunity to 
go to trial if necessary.122  This characteristic makes the MBCA 
model more attractive than the Delaware and New York models; the 
right to bring suit is never waived under the MBCA, so shareholders 
always have that option during negotiations.123  Also, if the company 
is in fact breaking the law, the shareholder can always ask a judge or 
jury to make the determination of whether changes are needed in the 
structure of the company.  Based on the facts and circumstances of 
individual cases, lawsuits are sometimes the only viable means of 
fixing the problem;124 only the MBCA model allows shareholders the 
opportunity for both collaboration and litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
The demand requirement is an important ADR mechanism that 
deserves new life in the corporate law landscape.  Because of its 
unpopular procedure, many plaintiffs have turned to large class action 
lawsuits that waste time and money while allowing the majority of 
problems within the company to go unchanged.  In order to revitalize 
the derivative suit, state legislatures should follow the MBCA model 
and amend the demand requirement so that its beneficial dispute-
resolving features are utilized.  Furthermore, if state legislatures strive 
to include an ADR procedure like demand into the early stages of the 
process, intracorporate remedies would be the only line of defense 
against corporate suits, and the number of state-court filings would 
decrease immensely.  By adopting the MBCA standard and adding a 
mediation component within the demand process, shareholders and 
boards will have the opportunity to work collaboratively when 
 
121 See Matwyshyn, supra note 113, at 1011. 
122 MBCA § 7.42. 
123 The Japanese system also allows a similar option for shareholders.  See Kawashima 
& Sakurai, supra note 105, at 36–37. 
124 Of course, the goal is to never allow a shareholder claim to get this far. 
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resolving company disputes, thus successfully bringing ADR back to 
where it is most needed: corporate law. 
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